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Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. GUILLAN (Peru) noted with satisfaction that the world trend towards the reduction of military expenditures was continuing. The reduction of military budgets, the demobilization of forces and the conversion of military industries should make possible the redirection of resources to development needs. Recognizing the close connection between security and development, Peru had reduced its military expenditures considerably in order to devote itself to the reconstruction of its economic and social sectors and the struggle against poverty.

2. As a steadfast proponent of peace, Peru had concluded mutually beneficial agreements with its neighbours on integration and cooperation to establish a development zone, which was a bilateral confidence-building measure directly related to regional disarmament. It must be pointed out, however, that the consequences of the arms race deriving from the ideological confrontation between East and West were still making themselves felt and it was therefore necessary to speed up the process of disarmament.

3. Peru had always been interested in the practical implementation of regional programmes for the limitation of conventional arms. In that tradition, it had proposed at the first summit meeting of Latin American countries the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America. The United Nations might lend additional impetus to that regional initiative with the help of its regional centres for disarmament.

4. Turning to the question of nuclear disarmament, he said that it remained urgent because the threats connected with the proliferation of nuclear weapons had not yet been eliminated. The peoples of the United Nations needed a new conception of international security. Peru was among those who were in favour of a nuclear non-proliferation regime without prejudice to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and considered that many regions might follow the example of the Latin American countries by establishing nuclear-free zones on the model of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Peru was also in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the adherence to it of all States. For that reason, Peru had taken and would continue to take an active part in the preparation of the forthcoming review conference on the Treaty.

5. Referring to the need for cessation of all nuclear tests, he expressed hope that the current negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be successful, welcomed the decision of the nuclear Powers to extend the moratorium on nuclear tests and expressed regret that the tests recently carried out had broken that tacit international moratorium and might in turn give rise to a "chain reaction". Summing up, he said that further concrete results in the disarmament negotiations would be a pledge of peace and development.

(Mr. Guillan, Peru)

6. The current political situation made possible the full practical realization of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Peru attached great importance to the innovative ideas set out by the Secretary-General in his "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277*-S/24111*). Peruvian contingents had already taken part in United Nations operations in various countries and his country was now considering the establishment of units earmarked for United Nations service. He added, however, that the new and complex tasks proposed in the "Agenda for Peace" should be matched by a new agenda for development intended to overcome the current stagnation of international cooperation in that field. In a world which was becoming one economic unit, the problems of political security could only be satisfactorily resolved if adequate attention was also given to social and economic problems.

7. Mr. DIMITROV (Bulgaria) said that Europe was not isolated from the contradictory trends of the present day. On the one hand, there were the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990 and the Vienna document of 1992 on confidence and security-building measures, which had established a stable new foundation for cooperative security within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and consultations with the Western European Union (WEU). A network of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe would furnish the pillars of the future common security structure. Bulgaria was actively cooperating with NATO and openly declared its readiness to shoulder responsibility and act as a reliable partner, even to the extent of becoming a full member of that organization.

8. At the same time the war in former Yugoslavia condemned a part of Europe to long-term instability with direct negative consequences for the military security and economic situation of adjacent States. Bulgaria, with its constructive policy on the Balkans, played a stabilizing role in the region. However, the strict implementation of sanctions against former Yugoslavia had resulted in severe economic losses which might jeopardize the pace of reforms and social peace in Bulgaria. The President of Bulgaria had referred to that question in his address to the General Assembly at the current session. Bulgaria hoped that the international community would assist it in overcoming its economic and social problems.

9. The decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was a major breakthrough in the decades-long effort to eradicate the nuclear threat. It was to be hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would live up to their enormous responsibility and would contribute to the early and successful outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. A future comprehensive test ban treaty should be verifiable, universally adhered to and of indefinite duration.

10. Among the priorities for peace and security, Bulgaria attached special importance to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of excessive accumulations of conventional weapons in regions of crisis or potential conflict. It regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the major building block of the international arms control regime. Despite some criticism, it was broadly recognized that the treaty effectively served the

(Mr. Dimitrov, Bulgaria)

security interests of all States. Bulgaria favoured an indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty beyond 1995.

11. In its opinion, the recent positive developments in the direction of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be consolidated through further steps towards the full implementation of all its provisions. In that context, Bulgaria looked forward to the early adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon-free States of those independent republics of the former Soviet Union which had not yet joined it. The conclusion in 1993 of the START II Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation represented a further step in the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals and would greatly facilitate the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The viability of the non-proliferation regime would also be enhanced by extending credible and legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to that Treaty.

12. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to the nuclear safeguards regime should be further enhanced. IAEA must receive all the resources necessary to strengthen that regime, conduct special inspections and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council, and all States should strictly abide by their international obligations to the Agency.

13. Bulgaria supported current efforts to widen and enhance international cooperation in implementing the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). His delegation welcomed the idea introduced at the current session of the General Assembly by the President of the United States of America of transforming MTCR from a limited-membership agreement to a set of rules that could command universal adherence to that regime. Bulgaria was ready to cooperate in the establishment of internationally agreed standards, guidelines and norms of export control of dual-use materials, equipment and technology for non-proliferation purposes. The underlying purpose of the harmonization of approaches to export controls was not to restrict international trade but rather to widen trade relations in sensitive areas, under effective non-proliferation commitments. Final preparations were being made in Bulgaria to establish a comprehensive national system of export controls in line with existing international standards and covering all sensitive areas, including nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related items and technologies.

14. Bulgaria attached great importance to the entry into force in 1995 of the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and hoped that all countries would adhere to that Convention. Of the more than 150 States that had already signed the Convention, Bulgaria had been among the first to sign in January 1993 and was in the process of preparing its early ratification. Bulgaria had ensured the successful start of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague by contributing in advance to its budget. Bulgaria was ready to participate in the forthcoming pilot inspections and to submit all data and information as required under the Convention.

(Mr. Dimitrov, Bulgaria)

15. Another urgent and achievable goal was the establishment of an effective mechanism for verifying compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. His delegation supported the convening of a special conference to examine the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures.

16. Bulgaria shared the view that increased openness and transparency in armaments could strengthen peace and stability. The Register of Conventional Arms, which the Organization had established in 1993, would be an effective international instrument for preventing excessive stockpiling of offensive conventional weapons. The Government of Bulgaria had submitted for inclusion in the Register all the necessary data on arms transfers and other available background information, as provided in General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 and 47/52 L of 15 December 1992. It hoped that all Member States would be equally willing to support the effective functioning of the Register. The inclusion in the reports of information relating to national production was an important element of the future evolution of the Register. In the interest of promoting conventional disarmament and transparency, Bulgaria supported the convening of a review conference of the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

17. Bulgaria noted with satisfaction that the Disarmament Commission had agreed on guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security (A/48/42, annex II). The guidelines were a timely document, and his delegation was prepared to support a draft resolution on the subject.

18. The elaboration of effective arms control and disarmament verification procedures could contribute to a climate of trust and understanding among States. His delegation would support a decision on further research or the updating of the 1990 report of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (A/45/372 and Corr.1, appendix). In accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/45 of 9 December 1992, Bulgaria had submitted its detailed views on the subject (A/48/227/Add.1).

19. Bulgaria noted with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on a United Nations study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305). The report gave special consideration to multilateral mechanisms for international cooperation. As a country that had participated in the preparation of the study, Bulgaria was prepared to sponsor a resolution on the subject, which would recommend that Member States should take into account the conclusions contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts in their future activities.

20. Mr. VORONTSOV (Russian Federation) said that, as the President of the Russian Federation had declared in his address of 8 October 1993, Russian foreign policy would remain unchanged. Under existing conditions, the Russian Federation's attention in the area of disarmament would be focused on the

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implementation, at the lowest possible costs, of arms reduction agreements; the conclusion of the process of coordinating new agreements in the course of the negotiations already under way; efforts to prevent the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery and the newest technologies of arms production; the development of further arms regulation measures in areas where such measures had not yet been taken, and the deepening of confidence- and security-building measures in relations between States.

21. His delegation supported the main guidelines and theses of the Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), and stressed that the integration of disarmament and security-building efforts would help strengthen the independent role of the disarmament process.

22. His delegation emphasized the importance of the earliest entry into force of the 1991 Treaty between the USSR and the United States of America on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic offensive Arms (START-I), which had already been ratified by four of its five participants. His delegation called on friendly Ukraine to ratify START-I as soon as possible, fulfil its obligation under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol and, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That would open the way for the entry into force of the START-II Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Russian Federation was convinced that the Russian-Ukrainian agreements on nuclear issues, signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in the Crimea on 3 September 1993 removed all questions and doubts that might have existed with respect to the advisability of the earliest ratification of START-I.

23. The Russian Federation attached paramount importance to the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the regime based thereon. The Treaty should become universal, and the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty should make it of unlimited duration. His delegation welcomed the accession of Belarus, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to that Treaty, and expected that the example of Belarus would be followed without further delay by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries of the former Soviet Union that had not yet done so. He called upon other States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to consider the issue once again, taking into account the specific steps that were being taken by the major nuclear Powers.

24. The Russian Federation welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had finally reached an important decision to start multilateral negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was essential to ensure that those negotiations did in fact open in January 1994, when the Conference on Disarmament began its session, and that the General Assembly should declare its unanimous support for the negotiations. He hoped that the recent test conducted by China, which had provoked universal dismay, would remain an isolated episode. The Russian Federation called for restraint in that area.

25. The Conference on Disarmament must start focused discussions on the elaboration of a multilateral agreement on security assurances to non-nuclear-

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weapon States, under which both nuclear and non-nuclear countries would enter into specific mutual obligations.

26. The Russian Federation intended to initiate substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on developing a multilateral agreement on the verifiable cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such an agreement would presumably necessitate arrangements whereby all nuclear-weapon Powers would place weapons materials released in the process of destroying nuclear weapons under IAEA international controls. In the interests of transparency, the Russian Federation was ready to exchange, within that framework, data on the quantity of such materials and their storage facilities.

27. At the current session, the Russian Federation had already confirmed its intention to accede to the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and called upon all States possessing such technology to follow suit. In that process, it was essential to agree upon equal rights and obligations for the participants, which would make possible the unimpeded export of peaceful space technologies. The Russian Federation was prepared to consider placing its satellite launching technology at the disposal of international projects, including those under United Nations auspices. In the long term, it was advisable to consider establishing, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations, an international mechanism to control the export of missiles and missile technology with the participation of both supplier States and countries interested in obtaining rocket technologies for peaceful purposes.

28. The Russian Federation affirmed the historic importance of the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) and supported the efforts by the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to prepare the Convention's entry into force. The Russian Federation welcomed the signing of the CWC by more than 150 States and hoped that it would become truly universal.

29. Continued efforts were also needed to strengthen the regime of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In the view of the Russian Federation, the results of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts which had studied potential verification measures were positive. It favoured the convening of a special conference of States parties to the Convention, to consider the report by the Group of Experts and to determine follow-up measures to establish the Convention's verification mechanism.

30. Commending the establishment by the United Nations of the Register of Conventional Arms, the Russian Federation confirmed its intention to continue to provide data to the Register on a yearly basis, supported further consideration of the issue of transparency in armaments at the Conference on Disarmament and in other international forums and had no objection to the inclusion of that item in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. His delegation also reaffirmed the intention of the Russian Federation to continue to provide data to the United Nations in accordance with the standardized reporting system on military expenditures.

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31. There was an increasingly urgent need for regional and subregional disarmament measures. In that context, he stressed the importance of the implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, agreed upon earlier in 1993 by the Disarmament Commission.

32. The Russian Federation believed that the elaboration of effective agreements with a strong disarmament component should form an integral part of United Nations peace-keeping activities. In view of the sharp increase in the scale of internal ethnic conflicts and in the bloodshed resulting therefrom, it had put forward an initiative to establish restrictions under international law on the use of the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons systems in those conflicts.

33. Most important among the new problems faced at the current stage of disarmament was that of the conversion of military industrial facilities to civilian purposes. The United Nations could promote practical measures designed to increase investments for conversion purposes by conducting studies and making recommendations on various aspects of conversion.

34. The Russian Federation welcomed the combined approach to the consideration of disarmament issues and the strengthening of international security which had become established practice in the First Committee. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations fulfilled its mandated role as an effective peacemaking organization, a draft resolution had been prepared on the maintenance of international security and his delegation, together with the other sponsors, intended to submit it for consideration by the First Committee.

35. During the spirited discussion of the issue, there had appeared to be agreement that it would be inadvisable to undertake a radical rearrangement of the mechanism for negotiation and deliberation in the area of disarmament, although a gradual development of that mechanism was still possible. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the consultations on the issue of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament would be successfully concluded before its next session. As for the First Committee itself, his delegation supported the initiative for the rationalization of its agenda.

36. Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) said that, despite many uncertainties in the unfolding new world, current changes raised hopes of a safer world and a more stable international order.

37. Mongolia attached particular significance to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a measure to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The signing of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) was an important step in the process of nuclear disarmament and Mongolia hoped that other nuclear States would join that process. It also hoped that the example of Belarus, which had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would be followed by the other States which had signed the 1992 Lisbon Protocol.

38. Noting the growing importance of the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he said that, in his country's opinion, the NPT

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should be strengthened and extended indefinitely at the 1995 Conference. It was vital for all parties to the Treaty to comply fully with their commitments.

39. In that connection, particular importance was attached to the cessation of nuclear tests and he noted the exceptional importance of the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. All the necessary prerequisites were in place for work on that issue to be completed at an early date and it would be only logical for that work to be completed before the 1995 Conference.

40. His delegation believed that all avenues should be explored in attaining the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and reiterated its view that a practical step towards that goal would be to amend the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. A successful outcome to negotiations on a comprehensive test ban would be greatly assisted if States refrained from conducting nuclear tests. Expressing his regret over the recent underground nuclear test conducted by China, he urged that country not to carry out any more tests and expressed the hope that other nuclear Powers would continue their moratorium.

41. His country had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and supported the idea of turning the whole Central Asian region into such a zone. Mongolia was also in favour of the early conclusion of a legally binding agreement on nuclear security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and supported the idea of convening a special conference of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.

42. With regard to the issue of mine clearance, Mongolia had been a sponsor of the resolution on that subject recently adopted by the General Assembly and sympathized with the idea of convening a review conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

43. In connection with the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (A/47/42, Annex 1), his country noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had established an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments. The 1993 substantive session of the Commission had adopted guidelines and recommendations for a regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security. Although it had fallen short of reaching agreement on another important item on its agenda - the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields - his country hoped that the Commission would be able to finalize its work on the matter at its next session. His delegation deemed it necessary that agreement should be reached as soon as possible on the inclusion of that new item in the agenda of the Commission's next session.

44. In conclusion, he said that his delegation attached great importance to efforts to improve the existing disarmament structures of the United Nations, including the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. The activities of the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament had proved to be increasingly

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effective in encouraging regional dialogue and confidence-building, and they should be supported in every way possible. His delegation also looked forward with interest to the deliberations on the question of further rationalizing the work of the First Committee.

45. Mr. RAZALI (Malaysia) said that the winds of change from the end of the cold war had left indelible imprints on issues relating to disarmament and international security. The threat of a nuclear holocaust from two ideologically distinct and antagonistic blocs was over. There had been positive developments in the field of nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament. Regional measures had played their own important role. The United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, had been in the forefront of the global drive towards genuine disarmament. Yet the world was still far from having achieved complete disarmament.

46. Malaysia remained committed to the goal of attaining complete disarmament. Nuclear weapons should no longer be a factor of power leverage in relations between States. In that connection, it was important that the moratorium on testing should be firmly maintained.

47. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in January 1993, could be termed the most serious attempt to curb proliferation by eliminating a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention's provisions on the destruction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and on international verification were new benchmarks for future arms limitation agreements. Agreement on the Convention had been achieved on the basis of compromises and concessions that had made it possible to find a reasonable balance between the need for confidence-building and verification and the sovereign right of Member States to protect national security interests by peaceful means. His country believed that the Convention could also be used to improve the Biological Weapons Convention.

48. He welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had been mandated to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Among the most pressing issues to be resolved was the relationship between negotiations in the Conference and any parallel consultations or negotiations among the five nuclear Powers and the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. Malaysia shared the view that the Conference should be given the primary role. In that connection, he underlined the need for an internationally applicable verification system for compliance with the comprehensive test-ban treaty. It should clearly be universally applicable - applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of such a treaty would also have a decisive influence on the outcome of the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

49. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, with 157 States parties, was so far the most widely supported arms control treaty in existence. Its major weakness was that it was discriminatory, in that it made a distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States - the "haves" and the "have-nots". It also suffered from several shortcomings, especially with regard to its monitoring and verification mechanism. With its concentration on averting horizontal

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

proliferation, the Treaty did not deal in an effective way with vertical proliferation. A holistic approach to non-proliferation - universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory - was urgently needed. Malaysia shared the view that there should be universal adherence to the Treaty and that it should be unconditionally and indefinitely extended in 1995. Putting an end to proliferation and eliminating nuclear weapons was particularly significant, given that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily decided not to acquire nuclear weapons.

50. An important focus of confidence-building measures was transparency in armaments. International security and stability would be enhanced by increased openness and transparency in the military field, particularly in the area of arms transfers. There was therefore an urgent need to ensure the success of the Register of Conventional Arms and to expand its scope by including further categories of equipment and data relating to military holdings and procurement, as well as detailed information on research and development, arms storage conditions and military budgets.

51. Malaysia believed that the United Nations had a pivotal role and primary responsibility with regard to all disarmament issues. In particular, it was in favour of the General Assembly playing a greater role in all multilateral disarmament efforts, in addition to the role played by the Security Council, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Malaysia shared the belief expressed in that report that disarmament was the responsibility of all States. It also supported the Secretary-General's call for the countries in a region to take the initiative on their own or in consultation with international organizations to work towards greater transparency in the transfer of armaments and disarmament.

52. There was a clear connection between disarmament and development. Excessive military expenditure stifled economic growth and adversely affected the scope and content of international economic cooperation. Third world countries could not afford to join in the arms race. The developing countries and those with economies in transition needed development, not armaments. Although the so-called "peace dividend" had never materialized, productive resources freed as a result of disarmament should add to the possibilities of alleviating poverty, from which a quarter of the world's population continued to suffer. At the same time, it was important to remember that the settlement of regional disputes was essential for the creation of conditions which would enable States to reallocate their limited resources to economic growth and development.

53. Given the importance of the Conference on Disarmament, his country called on the members of the Conference to take into account the views of countries which were not members, and supported the expansion of its membership.

54. The times were conducive to the achievement of genuine disarmament. A new system of international security had to be established, instilling States with confidence that they no longer needed abundant weaponry. Such a system should also deal with problems relating to effective weapons disposal and the consequences of implementing reductions and include specific measures to

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

redirect manufacturing and research and development capacities from military to civilian endeavours.

55. Mr. DANKWA (Ghana) said that the contours of the world order which countries sought to construct out of the debris of the cold war remained undefined. The international community had come to the realization that peace could not be secured on the basis of the accumulation of the most effective and deadly weapons. The cherished concept of the "balance of power" had been shown to be merely a contrivance for the competitive acquisition of arms and ammunition. The concept of security that had evolved during the cold war appeared outdated. Security should no longer be defined in terms of the survival or dominance of the mighty. Nor should it be rooted in unregulated struggle among States to impose their will on each other. A lasting peace should be founded on the purposes and principles of the Charter.

56. His delegation was convinced that the acquisition of arms was by no means the best nor indeed the most effective means of guaranteeing security. Lasting peace could only be achieved through freedom, equality, justice and law. For that reason the First Committee should pay due attention to the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as required under Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly, through the Committee, must play its role in guaranteeing peace and security.

57. His delegation shared the regret and concern expressed by the international community following the nuclear explosion carried recently by China. In that connection, credit was due to the other four nuclear Powers who had decided to maintain their voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.

58. While the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in January 1994 on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was welcome, it fell short of the expectations and specific request of the General Assembly, as contained in its resolution 47/47 of 9 December 1992. For if the Conference failed to heed the wishes of the Member States of the Organization, as reflected in the resolutions of the relevant organs, then the agreement reached on general and complete disarmament could not be placed under effective international control - that was the understanding on which the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. The same consideration also explained the urgent need to broaden the membership of the Conference with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of its decisions. The need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference should no longer be seen in the cold-war context - of ensuring geographical balance with due regard for the particular responsibilities of the nuclear Powers now seemed more relevant.

59. With regard to preparations for the 1995 review conference, Ghana considered that the nuclear and threshold States would have to commit themselves to complete and total disarmament before the non-nuclear States would agree to relinquishing their nuclear potential. The discriminatory notion that some countries could be entrusted with nuclear weapons while others could not was unacceptable to his delegation. As to the duration of the extension of the Treaty, that would be determined by the nature and scope of the review of its application.

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(Mr. Dankwa, Ghana)

60. Given its preference for peace and security founded on freedom, equality, justice and law, the delegation of Ghana expressed concern regarding the appearance of a new restricted club, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It would have been preferable if the initiative on that regime had been developed within the framework of the United Nations, without creating the impression that it had been imposed on Members. An example of how that could have been done was the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in January 1993.

61. The General Assembly had been expected at its forty-seventh session to extend the scope of the Register of Conventional Arms, established by General Assembly resolution 467/36. However, in General Assembly resolution 47/52, it had merely taken note of the suggestions made by the Secretary-General. In that connection it should be stressed that the continued operation of the Register beyond the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly would be determined by the efforts of Member States, through a General Assembly resolution, to extend the scope of the Register.

62. The end of the cold war and the economic recession sweeping through the world confirmed the urgent need to carry out internal and external reforms and to reject dependency on military might. Nuclear-test-ban and non-proliferation arrangements, missile technology control, verification measures and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be seen as transitory arrangements with a view to complete and total disarmament. The implementation of such measures was likely to check the tendency to resort to military might for the solution of what were essentially political problems. For that reason Ghana urged the Committee to supplement the disarmament and arms control measures with positive confidence-building measures in accordance with the provisions of the Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace". It was essential to speed up the process of converting military structures, while regional disarmament centres should be provided with adequate resources to implement such confidence-building measures at regional level.

63. Mr. Pengiran Abdul MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) said that the work of the Committee and its appraisal of the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" would be most timely. Although there had been a number of positive developments since the Committee had last met, the momentum towards achieving greater global security seemed to have slowed down.

64. His delegation congratulated the United States and Russian Federation on having signed the Start-II Treaty; it hoped that the Treaty would be implemented and that efforts would be made by the signatory States to resolve any remaining difficulties. It was pleased that many countries had signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and hoped that good progress would be made by the time of the 1995 review conference. It also welcomed the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention had been signed by such a large number of countries, and hoped that number would increase in future and that the Convention would be ratified and fully implemented.

65. The delegation of Brunei Darussalam was concerned by the fact that in many regions the arms race continued unabated. The members of ASEAN were committed

(Mr. Pengiran Abdul Momin,
Brunei Darussalam)

to promoting peace and security through dialogue, cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the fact that the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia had been unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. The Treaty would increase mutual trust not only among the ASEAN member countries, but also with neighbouring States. Furthermore, ASEAN had launched a regional forum in which countries from the region as well as outside the region took part to discuss security matters of common concern. Such regional arrangements complemented the peace-building efforts of the United Nations. It was vital that members of the Organization should work together to promote international peace and security.

66. Mr. KEATING (New Zealand) said that the work of the United Nations in disarmament matters had been a major priority for New Zealand. A new climate of trust and cooperation had begun to characterize relations in the United Nations system. It opened up new opportunities for resolving disarmament issues on a multilateral level.

67. The most important event in the field of disarmament in 1993 had been the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to launch negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. New Zealand had firmly opposed nuclear testing in all international forums and each year had submitted resolutions to the First Committee urging the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiating an effective and verifiable ban on the testing of all nuclear devices in all environments. The negotiations would be greatly facilitated if the nuclear-weapon States carried out no further nuclear tests. His delegation greatly appreciated the restraint of the United States, the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom, which had not conducted any tests for more than a year, but noted with regret that China continued its tests.

68. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the most serious threats to the world, in its search for stability after the cold war. The centrepiece of the non-proliferation regime was the NPT. The real progress achieved in recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament through joint action taken by the United States, the former Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation should help to create favourable conditions for the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

69. In spite of the significant achievements, the NPT had not yet lived up to the expectations of its drafters. Some of the major Powers had still not adhered to it, prompting concern among the international community. A further cause of concern was the action of certain countries which were party to the Treaty. New Zealand called upon all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to recognize the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

70. Many members of the international community, including countries in the Asia-Pacific region had been following the activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with great concern. New Zealand had joined other countries - the last time at the IAEA general conference - in urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the Treaty and in connection with safeguards, which remained in force. That country's

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unwillingness to comply with the safeguards agreement was one of the reasons for the serious problems in regional and international security. Iraq's non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty also testified to the urgent need to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

71. His country continued to be concerned about the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. The Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the NPT were key documents in that field. Kuwait had given full support to the preparations for the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to the work recently concluded by the experts regarding verification measures relating to biological weapons, whose final report provided a solid basis for further work to elaborate a comprehensive and effective verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. His delegation urged all States Parties to request the depository Powers to convene a special conference of States Parties to launch the negotiation process in 1994.

72. While the potential for destruction posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons was vast, it should not be overlooked that almost all death and destruction in war had been caused by conventional weapons, which consumed the bulk of the world's excessive military expenditure. In 1991, a concrete step had been taken to increase mutual confidence and security through measures to increase transparency in armaments and openness in conventional arms transfers. New Zealand was among the 80 States which had provided information for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

73. His country, which had participated in mine-clearing operations in Afghanistan and Cambodia, had ratified the Convention on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention) and its Protocols. Aware of the need to address a number of serious weaknesses which limited its effectiveness, his delegation supported the call to convene a review conference which would seek to strengthen the Convention.

74. In order to attain the key goals in the area of disarmament and arms control, it was necessary to strengthen and make more effective the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, which must adapt to the new international situation. His delegation believed that disarmament and international security items should be fully merged in the general debate and for consideration and action on resolutions, and that international security issues should be given the attention that they deserved in the debate.

75. The Disarmament Commission had taken some steps to streamline its agenda and working methods. Noting that the three-item phased agenda remained an important goal, he said that the results of the past session had been mixed. The completion of the item on the regional approach to disarmament was among the achievements, and his delegation was particularly pleased that the adopted guidelines and recommendations (A/48/42, annex II) recognized the significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and stated that extraregional States should respect the status of such zones. An important contribution of the South Pacific region to promoting the principle of non-proliferation was the establishment, in accordance with the 1985 Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of

(Mr. Keating, New Zealand)

the Pacific Ocean (the Treaty of Rarotonga), of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. His delegation regretted that despite its considerable efforts, the Disarmament Commission had not yet achieved consensus on the item on the role of science and technology, and welcomed the fact that the item would be discussed during the informal consultations along with the item on nuclear disarmament.

76. If the Conference on Disarmament was to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements, its membership should be expanded. The international community sought an early and satisfactory resolution of that matter.

77. In conclusion, he noted that the First Committee was the central political organ in the United Nations disarmament machinery. It was one of the few bodies in which not only the great and powerful States but also the groups of smaller States could create a climate of confidence and security. The progress made by the First Committee each year enabled the United Nations to retain its critical role in promoting the implementation of practical disarmament measures and strengthening international security.

78. Mr. ABULHASAN (Kuwait) said that 50 years of bipolarity in the world had made it impossible to settle many conflicts. With the ending of the cold war, there was a growing conviction within the United Nations that it was possible to establish a system of maintaining international peace and security based on disarmament and the allocation of resources for social and economic development and the protection of human rights.

79. Among the most notable recent achievements was the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In that regard, he commended the decision of the United States of America to introduce a moratorium on testing through the end of 1994. Kuwait urged all nuclear-weapon States to follow that example.

80. Peace was not an abstract concept but an expression of the will of all States and, in order to maintain peace, it was necessary to respect the principles of international law embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations, the principle of equal rights and obligations of States, the principle of peace and stability for all, the principle of the full understanding of "security" and the inadmissibility of the selective approach to defending the security of States. Kuwait had made its contribution to the United Nations effort to lay the foundations for a new world order that promoted the respect of the sovereignty and independence of States, observed the inviolability of international borders and guaranteed territorial integrity and right to dispose of one's natural resources. Therefore, when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, owing to the international will of States, expressed through the United Nations, that act of aggression was repulsed and Kuwait was liberated. The demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border constituted a significant contribution by the international community to the elimination of a regional hotbed of tension.

81. Kuwait, well aware of the danger of acquiring weapons of mass destruction, supported all international efforts to limit their proliferation and destroy them. His country's signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention bore witness to

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

that fact. His country was a party to the NPT, and supported all efforts aimed at transforming the Middle East into a region that was free of all forms of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation called on all States of the Middle East, including Israel, to adhere to the NPT and to open their nuclear facilities to international inspection. Similar principles for new relations in the Middle East had been set forth in the study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (A/45/435, annex) prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/65 of 7 December 1990. Progress towards establishing a nuclear-free zone required a major contribution on the part of the States of other regions, primarily the nuclear Powers.

82. The States of the Middle East also needed to adopt measures which provided for their accession to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact that Iraq was not yet a Party to that Convention was a source of concern. It was a comfort to note that the Special Commission established under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on 3 April 1991 had been entrusted in particular with the elimination of such weapons. The regime in Iraq, by virtue of its actions and its very essence, continued to threaten peace and security in the region. It continued to ignore the unanimous call that it respect all resolutions on the question of the aggression against Kuwait. However, his country was convinced of the Security Council's capacity to induce Iraq to fulfil its obligations under the Security Council resolutions and the requirements of international law.

83. It was to be hoped that the entire world would learn from Kuwait's bitter experience, and understand, in particular, the need for transparency in armaments, and that experience would be a deterrent to arms deliveries. Iraq's failure to comply with the NPT confirmed the importance of participating in and implementing disarmament agreements. It was also important to comply with the MTCR, as the proliferation of missiles as a form of conventional weapons and a means for delivering weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to regional and international security.

84. In Kuwait's view, that security in the Gulf was closely linked to international security. There were States in the world which were engaged in stockpiling conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and it was up to the international community to reduce the threat that presented. One way to achieve that goal was through observance and verification. He emphasized the importance of preventive diplomacy as one of the pillars of the maintenance of peace in the world, particularly in areas of tension.

85. In conclusion, he commended the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements. Kuwait was convinced of the importance of the Conference, and hoped that it would soon be included in its membership.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.